This paper studies firm-level antecedents and the impact on firm value of the adoption of OECD-type governance principles by Vietnamese listed firms at IPO. By doing so it examines whether agency insights are applicable in a context different from Western market economies and tries to uncover the obstacles for proliferation of OECD-type governance across firms in Vietnam. Using hand-collected data from 660 IPO firms in the Vietnamese stock market over the period 2006-2011 and using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation with instrumental variables to control for the problem of endogeneity, the results indicate that the adoption of board independence in terms of non-executive directors, supervisory board independence and use of high-quality auditor are significantly related to higher firm value at IPO. The results indicate that agency insights are applicable in a context of concentrated ownership and low investor protection and weak enforcement in that board independence and stricter monitoring by auditors lead to higher firm value. With respect to the proliferation of OECD-type governance the study reveals that only those firms that are less able to rely on local informal institutions will adopt these principles, despite the positive impact on firm value. The study shows that adoption of board independence and high quality external auditing is positively associated with firm value, as well as the appointment of directors who hold multiple board seats. However to ensure compliance with governance and transparency principles, formal institutional changes related to stricter enforcement of the regulation are of utmost importance.