In recent years many businesses have recognized the importance of commitment and trust in improving the performance of exchanging parties (Boersma, et al. 2003; Nooteboom, 2002; Sako and Helper, 1998; Forsgren et al. 1995; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Easton and Araujo, 1994; Williamson, 1993; Hakansson and Johanson, 1992). As a result, a great deal of attention has been paid by both economic and sociological scholars to develop concepts relevant for studying investment and trust (Williamson, 1985; Hakansson and Snehota, 1995). The economic and sociological approaches differ in their theoretical assumptions and concepts, and several efforts have been made to bridge the gap between these two perspectives, e.g. views of transaction cost economics and networking theory on the discussions of investment and trust, see Johansson and Mattson (1987) and Nooteboom (1993). Their findings show that while transaction cost approach focuses on opportunistic behavior of exchanging parties and the risk associates with it, networking theory focuses on its correlate trust. Networking theory also argues that trust minimizes transaction costs and it is a viable governance structure in a dynamic network environment (Hakansson and Johanson, 1993). Transaction cost theory explains investment in the form of credible commitment or reputation of the firm, and its discussion is limited to relationship specific investments. Networking theory notes that investment is the outcome of mutual adaptation processes and provides a broader way of measuring investments made in a relationship.